Abstract-Since the preliminary works of Kocher et al. in the nineties, studying and enforcing the resistance of cryptographic implementations against side channel analysis (SCA) is became a dynamic and prolific area of embedded security. Stochastic attacks, introduced by Schindler et al. [2] , form one of the main families of SCA and they offer a valuable alternative to template attacks which are known to be among the most efficient ones. However, stochastic attacks, as long as template attacks, have been initially designed for adversaries with a perfect copy of the target device in hand. Such a prerequisite makes them a pertinent tool when studying the implementations resistance against the most powerful adversaries, but it limits their pertinence as a cryptanalytic technique. Indeed, getting open access to a copy of the device under attack is difficult in practice and, even when possible, it remains difficult to exploit templates acquired on one device to attack another one. In light of this observation, several papers have been published to adapt stochastic attacks for contexts where the above prerequisite is no longer needed. They succeeded in defining practical attacks against unprotected implementations but no work was published until now to explain how stochastic attacks can be applied against secure implementations. In this paper, we deal with this issue. We first extend the previous analyses of stochastic attacks to highlight their core foundations. Then, we explain how they can be generalized to defeat first-order masking techniques, which are the main SCA countermeasures. Eventually, we illustrate the interest of the new attack by a series of experiments on simulated and real curves.
INTRODUCTION
S IDE Channel Analysis (SCA for short) exploits information that leaks from physical implementations of cryptographic algorithms. This leakage (e.g., the power consumption or the electromagnetic emanations) may indeed reveal information on the secret data manipulated during the execution. Among SCA attacks, two classes may be distinguished. The set of so-called profiling SCA [1] , [2] , [3] corresponds to a powerful adversary who controls a copy of the attacked device and involves it to evaluate the distribution of the leakage according to the processed values. Once such an evaluation is obtained, a maximumlikelihood approach is carried out to recover the secret data manipulated by the attacked device. The second set of attacks is composed of the so-called nonprofiling SCA. It corresponds to a weaker adversary who is only able to observe the targeted device behavior. In those attacks, the physical leakage is compared to some hypotheses got from a key-dependent model. Since the seminal work of Kocher et al. [4] in the late nineties , a large variety of statistical tests have been applied or introduced as distinguishers for this purpose [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] . The general purpose of those works was to better take advantage of the available information, e.g., by allowing the adversary to incorporate more precise leakage models in the statistics. This paper pays particular attention to the non-profiling SCA threat, because it relates to the classical kind of adversary encountered, e.g., by the smart card industry.
A SCA targeting the manipulation of a single variable is said to be univariate. To avoid instantaneous information leakage and, thus, to thwart univariate SCA, the classical strategy is to protect the implementation of the given algorithm by using secret sharing (a.k.a. masking) techniques [9] , [10] . In such schemes, the internal state of the processing is usually randomly split into two shares. When this strategy is followed, a so-called second-order SCA can still be performed by combining the leakages resulting from the manipulation of the shares. This enables the construction of a new signal that statistically depends on the secret that was shared. Those attacks are said to be multivariate. In view of the analyses in [11] , [12] , [13] and the experiments reported in [14] , [15] , it seems that ultivariate SCA with Pearson correlation coefficient as distinguisher and with preprocessing as proposed in [12] is always the most efficient nonprofiled attack when the leakage noise is nonnegligible.
Recently, a paper [16] has argued that the linear regression (LR) attack (a.k.a. stochastic attack) was a sound alternative to classical univariate nonprofiled SCA. Continuing the seminal analysis in [2] , the authors of [16] show that, whereas attacks like CPA or MIA require a sound model for the leakage (and the attack efficiency strongly depends on this choice), a LR attack needs a much weaker assumption. It indeed only requires that the deterministic part of the leakage can be expressed as a linear combination of functions chosen according to both the nature of the device and the algebraic structure algorithm under attack. Actually, Doget et al. [16] show that not only LR attacks encompass the classical CPA as a particular case but, thanks to their generic nature, they can even succeed in situations where CPA fails. In view of this result, it seems natural to investigate whether LR attacks can also be extended in multivariate contexts, and if yes, whether they remain a good alternative to the classical multivariate nonprofiled SCA.
In the particular context where a leakage profiling step is allowed, stochastic methods against masked implementations have already been studied by Lemke-Rust and Paar in [17] . However, nothing is said in this paper about how to apply the techniques when profiling is impossible (which is the case in practice). A first step toward this line has been done by Schindler in [18] . However, no details about the attack itself are given and several issues regarding the way how to implement it concretely are left open.
This paper starts from the same observations as [18] and aims at fully specifying a second-order attack based on LR techniques. It moreover studies the relationship between this new attack and classical second-order SCA (with and without profiling step). In the second part of the paper, the attack is carried out against the Boolean masking [19] , [20] and the arithmetic masking [21] . In both cases, attacks simulations and experiments are performed to corroborate the theoretical analysis and to confront it with real-life attack contexts. Thanks to those simulations and experimentations, we show that it is a valuable alternative to the classical second-order CPA, especially when the adversary has no precise knowledge about how the targeted device leaks information on the manipulated data.
PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATIONS

Statistics and Probability
Throughout this paper, random variables are denoted by large letters. A realization of a random variable, said X, is denoted by the corresponding lowercase letter, said x. A sample of several observations of X is denoted by ðxÞ or by ðx i Þ if an indexation is needed. It will sometimes be viewed as a vector defined over the definition set of X. The notation ðxÞ -X denotes the instantiation of the set of observations ðxÞ from X.
The mean of X is denoted IE½X, its variance by varðXÞ. The latter equals IE½ðX À IE½XÞ 2 . The covariance of random variables X and Y is denoted by covðX ; Y Þ and satisfies
A continuous random variable X is associated with a probability density function (pdf for short). In our context, a particular pdf called Gaussian pdf plays an important role. 
It corresponds to the euclidean distance between the vectorial representations of f and g.
Remark 1.
If the sum in (2) is computed over a set of observations ðx i Þ (instead of E) in a statistical regression context, then dðf; gÞ can be interpreted as the square root of a residual sum of squares (RSS for short) between the set of variables fðx i Þ to be predicted and the predictions gðx i Þ.
For a function f and a set G, we call distance between f and G the real value dðf; GÞ defined by:
If G is the space <g 1 ; . . . ; g d >, then (3) can be rewritten:
3 NEW ATTACK DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS
Attack Context
In this paper, we consider an adversary who has full access to a physical implementation of a cryptographic algorithm and observes the side-channel leakage of successive processings over known inputs. During those computations, it is assumed that an intermediate variable Z ¼ F k ðXÞ is manipulated. It depends on both a known variable X and a secret k, called key in the rest of the paper. Variables X and k are assumed to be defined over IF n 2 for some integer value n (e.g., n ¼ 8) and the function F : X; k 7 ! F k ðXÞ is a known function from IF 2n 2 into IF m 2 with m such that m n (e.g., F is an s-box and F k ðXÞ ¼ F ðX È kÞ). We denote by F À1 k a reciprocal function of F k , which maps each image of F k to its set of preimages.
It is moreover assumed that the cryptosystem is protected by first-order masking. This implies that Z is never accessed directly but is randomly split into two shares that are manipulated at different times. The manipulation of each share results in two observable physical leakages L 1 and L 2 . The analyses conducted in this paper are done under the assumption that the leakages satisfy:
where ? is an operation law such that ðIF ðÁÞ is a deterministic unknown function, and B 1 and B 2 are independent but identical unidimensional Gaussian variables. Random variables Z and V are also assumed to be independent from B 1 and B 2 .
Attack Description
In what follows, a new second-order attack is introduced, extending to a masked context the strategy proposed in [16] . The core idea is to discriminate the key candidates by processing a LR on a key-dependent variable, denoted Y hereafter, which combines the two leakages defined in (5 
where y N is a function of x parametrized by the number of collected measurements, and 1 ðxÞ and 2 ðxÞ, respectively, denote IE ½L 1 jX ¼ x and IE½L 2 jX ¼ x. For analysis purpose, the value y N ðxÞ is viewed 2 as an approximation of:
.
[LR]. For every key hypothesisk, compute:
where Gk denotes the space <g 1 Fk; . . . ; g d Fk>. . [Key candidate decision]. Select the key hypothesis for which ÁkðNÞ is minimal. A discussion about the new attack rationale will be conducted in the next section. We can however sum-up its main steps in the following way: First, and due to the univariate aspect of the LR, the leakages L 1 and L 2 are combined to form a univariate variable. This is the purpose of the fourth step, which can be viewed as the computation of an estimation y N ðxÞ of the covariance between L 1 and L 2 knowing X ¼ x. The latter covariance, viewed as a function of the random variable X, is denoted by Y in the following. The computation of the minimum distance during the fifth step involves LR to find a good model for the functional relationship between Y and X. The model is searched into a set of functions which basis is constructed by composing the g i with the key-hypothesis dependent function Fk defined in Section 3.1. This point is detailed in the next section while the way how to choose the family of functions ðg i Þ i is discussed in Section 3.4. The LR technique itself together with its link with the distance dðÁÞ between functions can be found in Section 3.5.
Remark 2. The distinguisher in (8) is equivalent to the maximization of the so-called coefficient of determination between the y N ðx i Þ and the gðx i Þ for g ranging over Gk (see [22] for more details about this coefficient). Hence, another way of interpreting our LR-based SCA is as follows: The attack attempts to explain the trace measurements ð'
2 Þ i in terms of a polynomial function of the bits of the hypothesis-dependent predicted values ðFkðx i ÞÞ i . The polynomial is searched into the set generated by the basis functions g i themselves viewed as polynomial functions with coefficients in IR. The idea is that only for the correct predictions will this give a good least-squares approximation. The natural measure of goodness-of-fit is the coefficient of determination, which can be interpreted as the proportion of the variance in the traces which is accounted for by the model. So, for a well-chosen regression function, only the correctly predicted bits will give a good explanation of the variance.
Rationale Behind the New Attack
Since L 1 and L 2 satisfy (5), and random variables B 1 , B 2 , and V are independent, the definition of Y can be rewritten
where ' denotes the function
By construction, the function y N defined in Step 4 tends toward y as the number of measurements increases. Therefore, from (9) and some terms rearrangements, one deduces the following limit of ÁkðNÞ, where we recall that y is a function of x:
ÁkðNÞ ¼ lim
Assuming that Fk is balanced, (10) simplifies to
Now, depending on whetherk equals k or not, we have the two following situations: (11) cannot be simplified. From those two situations, we deduce that the new attack outputs the correct key if the distance between ' F k F À1 k and H is minimized whenk ¼ k (e.g., when ' F k F À1 k equals '). It highlights the importance of the choice of the basis ðg i Þ i . This choice is discussed in the next section.
2. The pertinence of this definition of yðxÞ (and hence of the construction of y N ðxÞ in the attack) is discussed in Section 3.6.
Basis Choice
As pointed out in previous section, the basis choice is essential because it directly impacts the attack efficiency. Ideally, the basis should ensure the adversary that dð'
; HÞ is minimal whenk ¼ k. In this section, we propose a strategy for the adversary to choose it.
By definition, the function ' to be approximated belongs to the space F of all the functions from IF 
where each term z u denotes the monomial (function)
m with values in f0; 1g [23] . The degree of such a monomial is defined as the Hamming weight of u. It can moreover be checked that the family of functions
spans F . In the following, we denote by F d the subset of F that contains all the functions of degree lower than or equal to d. This set is spanned by the basis ðz u Þ u2IF m 2 ;HWðuÞ d . Let us now come back to the attack described in Section 3.2 and analyzed in Section 3.3. If the set H spanned by the functions ðg i Þ i equals F (i.e., ðg i Þ i is also a basis of F ), then for any Fk and F k it is obvious that ' F k F À1 k is in H. As a consequence, the distance dð' F k F À1 k ; HÞ is always null, the key hypothesisk being equal to k or not. This implies that choosing the basis ðg i Þ i as large as possible is not a sound approach for our attack. Let us now denote by J the set of functions fF k F À1 k ; k 6 ¼kg. A much better strategy an adversary can follow is to look for a subspace H such that ' 2 H (i.e., the distance between ' and H is null) while the distance between the two sets H and H J is as high as possible ( Fig. 1 illustrates it ). For such a purpose, we propose here to make an assumption on the degree d of ' and to set H ¼ is very likely to have a high degree (close to m) due to the cryptographic properties 3 of F , then none of
To conclude this section, we give hereafter an example of our strategy in a realistic attacks context. Example 1. Let us assume that F k is an AES s-box. Then, the set J contains all the functions that are the composition of AES SubBytes with AES InvSubBytes, the two s-boxes being parameterized by different keys. By property of the AES s-box, every function in J will be at a large distance to the set of affine functions (this relates to the high nonlinearity of the s-box). Hence, a good strategy is to assume that ' belongs to the set of linear functions
1 ). Indeed, in this case the LR will compute a good approximation of ' in F 1 , while by definition of J , it will not be able to compute a good approximation of ' j for any j 2 J . Remark 3. In our strategy, we assumed that the attacker targets the result of a nonlinear transformation (e.g., an s-box) and, thus, that the function F is likely to have a high degree. Nevertheless, one can choose to target the result of a linear transformation (typically, the manipulation of the sensitive variable just before the nonlinear transformation). In this case, the choice of the basis is less obvious and will be very dependent on the algebraic properties of '. Therefore, the choice of a basis must be adapted to the knowledge or assumptions on both ' and F (i.e., it depends on both the nature of the leakage and the nature of the targeted sensitive variable).
LR Processing in Our Context
In this section, we describe the LR technique when applied to our context. For a basis of functions ðg i Þ 1 i d , a set of noisy observations ðy N ðxÞÞ x2IF n 2
as defined in (6) and a key candidatek, the goal is to estimate:
The LR technique involved in this paper starts by building the following regression matrix:
where the value x in FkðxÞ is represented as an integer corresponding to the binary representation of x 2 IF n 2 . From the vectorỹ N ¼ ðy N ð0Þ; . . . ; y N ð2 n À 1ÞÞ and M, the following column vector is computed:
Under the Gaussian assumption, it is proved [22] that ðg 1 ; . . . ; g d Þ Á is the function in <g i > 1 i d that is the closest one to x 7 ! y N ðxÞ for the euclidean distance. 3. This property relates to the fact that, by construction, functions F k and Fk must be as independent as possible when parametrized by different keys. Moreover, the family of functions F k must have a high algebraic degree (close to m) to defeat linear and differential cryptanalyses. As a consequence, the composition of functions F k and Fk, with k 6 ¼k, must act as a random composition of functions with high algebraic degrees. With very high probability, such a composition results in a function with high degree. If required, this hypothesis may be tested for a target function F by computing the minimum degree of the functions in J .
Remark 4. We assumed that the function y N is defined for every value in IF n 2 . Nevertheless, in some cases (e.g., for a small N) it may happen that y N is defined only on a strict subset E of IF n 2 . In this case, the LR processing remains the same, except that lines corresponding to the values in IF n 2 nE are discarded from the matrix M. 3.6 Relationship with Other Attacks 3.6.1 Relationship with Second-Order CPA A second-order CPA using the centered product combining function has been introduced in [12] and compared favorably to other attacks based on the correlation coefficient. In fact, this CPA may be viewed as a particular case of our attack, where the space spanned by the basis ðg i Þ is reduced to a single function' that is assumed to approximate the function ' defined in (9) (e.g., the Hamming weight function is chosen for'). Indeed, in such a particular case, the distance computation (8) can be rewritten:
because we have H ¼ f'g. Now, asymptotically (14) becomes:
ÁkðNÞ ¼ dðy;' FkÞ ¼ dðy;ŷÞ;
where we have denoted' Fk byŷ and where we recall that y denotes ' F k . As a consequence, if ðY ;Ŷ Þ denotes the correlation coefficient between Y andŶ viewed as random variables functionally dependent on X, we get that (see Appendix "Relationship with Second-Order CPA-the Details" for the development details):
where a and b are independent of the key hypothesis provided that Y , Ŷ , IE½Y 2 , IE½Ŷ 2 , IE½Y , and IE½Ŷ are also independent of the key hypotheses.
4 Equation (15) shows that our new attack with space H reduced to a single function' is asymptotically equivalent to a second-order CPA involving the centered product as combining function and' as prediction function.
Relationship with Maximum-Likelihood Approach
In a second-order attack based on a maximum-likelihood approach [1] , [2] , [24] , [25] , the adversary knows for every z a good estimation of the pdf f z of the random variable ðL 1 ; L 2 ÞjZ ¼ z. With such a knowledge and a sample ð' i 1 ; ' i 2 ; x i Þ i -ðL 1 ; L 2 ; XÞ measured on the targeted device, the adversary then computes for each key candidatek, a set of predictions ðẑ i Þ i ¼ ðFkðx i ÞÞ i and selects the key that maximizes the product
Þ. This class of attack, which has first been introduced in [1] under the name of template attacks, is very powerful. However, as previously observed in many papers, the assumption that the adversary has a good approximation of f z in hand strongly limits the attack practicability and raises the need for alternative approaches. To some extent, the attack presented in Section 3.2 can be viewed as such an alternative. More precisely, it may be viewed as an application of the template attacks principle in a context, where the adversary has no a priori knowledge of the f z but tries to reconstruct them onthe-fly. To further discuss on this statement, let us develop the pdfs f z under Gaussian assumption.
When the leakage is defined as in (5), the f z are mixture of elliptic normal distributions [26] . Namely, they are defined such that: Our attack implicitly tries to approximate the distribution f z by a bivariate Gaussian pdf and this is actually the main difference between it and template attacks. The use of such an approximation is known in the literature as the technique of merging the mixture components [27] with a limited and fixed number of components (here 2). It leads us to make the following approximation: where x is one preimage of z through F k and where y satisfies (7) .
In view of the definitions ofm and AE z , it is clear that the only key-dependent parameter of the pdf approximation (17) is yðxÞ. Thus, testing whether an observation ð' 1 ; ' 2 Þ comes from a distribution Èm ;AEz reduces to test whether ð' 1 ; ' 2 Þ comes from a bivariate distribution with covariance yðxÞ for x 2 F À1 k ðzÞ. As explained in Section 3.3, our new attack computes an estimation of this variable, the estimation being parametrized by a key hypothesis. Then, to validate the hypothesis (or equivalently the quality of the approximation of yðxÞ for every x), a mean-of-square test is computed. It is well known that this test is equivalent to a maximum-likelihood computation under the Gaussian Assumption. Some simulations can be found in Appendix "A Word About Maximum Likelihood Approach" which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library at http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/TC.2012.112.
Remark 5.
Another more precise way of approximating the distributions may be to look for approximations by mixtures of Gaussian distributions. This approach has already been suggested in [17] but its soundness is still under discussion since it involves a class of algorithms, called expectation-maximization (EM) algorithms, which are difficult to deal with.
In previous sections, we exhibited a way to attack a masked implementation by using LR techniques. In the following, we aim at confronting our analyses with simulations in realistic scenarios (Sections 4.1 and 4.2) and experiments (Section 4.3). To ease the comparison, several attack parameters are considered:
1. the underlying masking scheme used to protect the sensitive variable; 2. the distinguisher involved in the key discrimination; 3. some distinguisher-related parameters to customize the attack; 4. the nature of the leakage (simulation or real curves); and 5. the attack efficiency of the attack (number of messages, and so on). Remark 6. Our main purpose is to compare the new attack with the CPA techniques that are the most widely used in practice. However, to have an analysis as exhaustive as possible, we also implemented second-order MIA attacks. Among the different techniques to process the MIA, we chose to implement the one based on histograms because it seems to be the most efficient in practice [28] . Further works may consist in deeper comparing the new attack with all the various MIA techniques [29] and also with the recently introduced attacks based on Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance estimator [30] . Those attacks indeed also aim to target masked implementations when the leakage has unpredictable behavior. Attack target. The attacks exploit the leakage related to the manipulation of two shares that jointly depend on a sensitive variable Z satisfying
where X corresponds to a 8-bit uniformly distributed random value known by the adversary and F denotes the AES s-box. Depending on the underlying masking scheme, the definition of the two shares differ. The following masking schemes are considered in our attacks:
1. First-order Boolean masking. The operation ? in (5) is the bitwise addition over IF (5) is the modular addition over Z Z=256Z Z. The two shares are Z þ V mod 256 and V , with V a uniformly distributed random variable independent of Z. Leakage simulations. Leakages have been simulated in accordance with (5) for different definitions of ðÁÞ, leading to the three following scenarios:
1. Scenario 1 (Hamming weight leakage). Equation (5) becomes:
In our attack settings, this first scenario is ideally suited for CPA because the model used by the adversary exactly corresponds to the deterministic function ðÁÞ.
Scenario 2 (Linear leakage). Equation (5) becomes:
with coefficients ð i Þ 0 i 8 uniformly picked from ½À1; 1. This scenario is used to observe the distinguishers behavior when the deterministic part of the leakage differs from the model used by the adversary. We restricted ourselves to functions ðÁÞ that are linear combinations in IR of the bit coordinates of the shared values. 3. Scenario 3 (Quadratic leakage). Equation (5) becomes:
with coefficients ð i Þ 0 i 8 and ð i;j Þ 1 i<j 8 uniformly picked from ½À1; 1. This scenario is used to observe the distinguishers behavior when the deterministic part of the leakage differs in degree from the model used by the adversary. We restricted ourselves to functions ðÁÞ that are quadratic combinations in IR of the bit coordinates of the shared values. Leakage measurements. The details about the leakage used in experiments have been confined to a dedicated section (see Section 4.3).
Attack distinguisher.
Correlation power analysis (CPA).
Those attacks approximate ðCðL 1 ; L 2 Þ; ðFkðXÞÞÞ to discriminate the key candidates, where CðÁÞ is a combining function from IR 2 to IR and is a model function deduced from CðÁÞ and an hypothesis on ðÁÞ. A second-order CPA with model is denoted by CPA 2. LR is used as described in this paper (see Section 3.2).
Mutual information analysis (MIA) with histogram
estimation (the choice of the bin-width is done using the rule proposed in [7] ) and Hamming weight model.
Model and basis choice. Albeit Z ? V and V jointly depend on Z, each masking scheme induces a different dependency relationship, which implies to adapt the attack strategy accordingly. Namely, for each of the attacks above, the choice of the consumption model (in CPA) or the choice of the basis (in LR attacks) require a careful attention.
To perform the second-order CPA, we chose the centered product combining of the leakages and we defined the optimal model function 6 as described in [31] under the assumption ðÁÞ ¼ HWðÁÞ. This kind of CPA is denoted CPA Opt in the sequel. As argued in Section 3.4, LR requires similarly a set of well-chosen basis functions to perform efficiently. To approximate the function ' : z 7 ! covððz ? V Þ ; ðV ÞÞ, we have analyzed different choices of basis 7 :
. lin, where the g i are the degree-1 monomials z 7 ! z u with HWu 1. . quad, where the g i are the monomials z 7 ! z u with HWu 2.
. cub, where the g i are the monomials z 7 ! z u with HWu 3.
. full, where the g i are the monomials z 7 ! z u with HWu 8. . deg2, where the g i are the degree-2 monomials z 7 ! z u with HWu ¼ 2. . Opt, where the basis is reduced to the constant function z 7 ! 1 and the function g corresponding to the optimal (prediction) function defined in [31] . In Section 4.1 (i.e., Boolean case), the basis Opt is denoted by HW to emphasis the affine equivalence between the optimal function and the Hamming weight when the optimal function is designed under the assumption ðÁÞ ¼ HW and ? ¼ È. In the sequel, an attack using the LR with basis basis will be denoted by LR-basis, where basis is chosen among lin, quad, cub, deg2, full, and Opt.
Remark 7.
It has been shown in Section 3.6 that CPA Opt is asymptotically equivalent to LR-Opt; nevertheless, we have conducted both attacks to confront this theoretical result to experimentations.
Attack efficiency. In the following, an attack is said to be successful if the good key is output by the attack. An attack is said to be more efficient than another if it needs less messages to achieve the same success rate. Success rate is measured over 1,000 tries.
We report and analyze in next sections our attack simulations results for Scenarios 1, 2, and 3 in case of Boolean (Section 4.1) and arithmetic masking schemes (Section 4.2). We inform the reader that we have plotted only attacks that are relevant. In other terms, some attacks never succeeded and, thus, have not been plotted to ensure readability of figures.
Simulation with Boolean Masking Scheme
In this section, we assume that L 1 and L 2 satisfy (19) (Scenario 1), or (20) (Scenario 2), or (21) (Scenario 3). For each attack listed in the previous section, we have plotted in Figs. 2, 3 , and 4 the success rate as a function of the number of messages. We did this in two different contexts: A nonnoisy one (B 1 and B 2 are null) and a noisy one (B 1 and B 2 have mean 0 and standard deviation 4).
In Scenario 1 without noise, MIA is the most efficient attack. When there is noise, however, LR-HW performs better than the others. As expected, in both contexts, CPA HW and LR-HW share the same efficiency, while the LR-lin attack is ranked second. This is due to the fact that the hypothesis made over ðÁÞ induces a model that exactly corresponds to the leakage function. Nevertheless, LR-HW and CPA HW stop to be the most efficient attacks in Scenarios 2 and 3. This must be a consequence of the fact that in those cases the model is built under the incorrect hypothesis ðÁÞ ¼ HWðÁÞ. In Scenario 2, LR-lin is the most efficient attack. The efficiency of the LR with basis lin is explained by the fact that y N ðÁÞ in (6) is linear when ðÁÞ does (this is a straightforward extension from the Hamming weight case shown in [31] to any linear function of the bit-coordinates) and it is, thus, well approximated in the linear basis. In Scenario 3, the results are rather the same than in Scenario 2 since LR-lin is still the most efficient attack. At first glance, this may appear as a surprising result because we could expect the LR-quad attack to be more efficient. Indeed, in this scenario y N can 6 . Notice that the optimal model function differs from one masking scheme to another and must therefore be computed for each different masking scheme.
7. Every basis contains the constant function, g 1 : z 7 ! 1. be exactly approximated given the basis quad but cannot with basis lin. So the estimation of y N returned by the LR is better in the quadratic case than in the linear one. Despite this difference, the attack with linear basis discriminates faster. This shows that in some circumstances, it may be sufficient to only approximate the linear part of the leakage and that the computation overhead brought on by a quadratic (or higher) basis is not counterbalanced by the amount of useful additional information it provides to the attacker. Eventually, it seems that for each attack and in each scenario, the presence of noise makes the curves to be closer from each other. Namely, attacks reaching a 100 percent success rate seem to become asymptotically equivalent when noise increases. It is explained by the fact that the number of messages needed to annihilate the noise is largely sufficient to have a good approximation with LR whatever the size of the basis.
Remark 8. As expected, MIA is always the less efficient attack except in a perfect condition (i.e., without noise and with the leakage deterministic part equal to the attack model-here Hamming weight-).
Simulation with Arithmetic Masking Scheme
In this section, L 1 and L 2 satisfy either ( In the arithmetic case, all attacks based on the optimal model are the most efficient ones, even in Scenarios 2 and 3. The LR-quad attack is ranked second for each scenario and its efficiency is close to that of LR-Opt and CPA Opt . In particular, it is always better than CPA HW and LR-lin, which actually do not achieve a success rate greater than 85 percent. This situation can be explained by the fact that the quadratic terms of the function y N defined in (6) have an important influence on the leakage when the masking is arithmetic and not Boolean. To illustrate this, focusing on LR-deg2 attack, it can be checked that its efficiency is close to that of LR-quad (namely the attack performs almost equivalently with and without the linear terms in y N ). The LR-cub attack is ranked third, behind the LR-quad. Therefore, considering the computation overhead induced by the use of a basis with cubic terms, there is no interest to apply the LR-cub attack instead of LR-quad, even if y N is probably better approximated in cub basis than in quad basis.
Remark 9. In the arithmetic case, MIA is often the less efficient attack. Only in the first scenario (leakage modeled as Hamming weight), MIA overpasses LR-deg2, LR-lin, and CPA-HW.
Attacks Experiments in Real Life
In previous sections, we have confronted our theoretical analyses with simulations in realistic scenarios. In the following, we aim at confronting our results against real measurements. Attack parameters like the target, the masking scheme and the distinguisher remain the same as previously defined while the leakage now comes from real power consumption curves.
Leakage Measurements
Power consumption leakages have been measured on a 8,051 8-bit microcontroller. In each measurement curve, the parts related to the manipulation of Z ? V and V are composed each of 100,000 points. We assumed the curves to be synchronized (a glitch is used to synchronize at the beginning of the manipulation processing). Since most of the attacks involve different model classes (e.g., only HW or linear or quadratic or cubic functions), their efficiency for a same given pair of points may greatly differ. In the case of attacks against arithmetic masking for instance, we got for some pairs of leakage points the attack CPA-Opt succeeding in around 2,050 traces (which is close to the optimality as shown in Table 1 ) whereas the attack LR-quad required more than 11,500 traces to retrieve the key ( Table 1 shows that the same attack can succeed for another choice of points in around 6,000 traces). This observation leads us to not systematically use the same pair of points for all the attacks. Actually, in our attack comparisons, only the pair of points of interest resulting in the maximal distinguishing value has been considered for each attack. Hence, before mounting each attack, a preprocessing step has been performed on the curves to determine the two most pertinent points of interest (the first point corresponding to Z ? V and the second one corresponding to V ). By definition, this pair of points is the one that optimizes the attack efficiency among the 100;000 2 possible pairs of points. This more or less corresponds to the definition given in [32] . For the CPA, the pair corresponds to the pair of points for which the error resulting from the approximation of the leakage by the attack model is minimal. For the regression-based attacks, the points of interest are those for which the error resulting from the approximation of the leakage in the basis is minimal. During the preprocessing, we have used the fact that we knew the values Z ? V and V manipulated by the device. Even if this does not correspond to a reallife adversary, this preprocessing allows us to perform each attack with the optimal choice of points of interest, which is a fair context to compare them together.
Remark 10. The search of the best points of interest is not a prerequisite for the attacks and must, therefore, not be considered as a profiling step. In fact, in this section we adopt a defensive point of view, meaning that we study the implementation resistance against each attack when it is launched in the most favourable conditions (namely for the best choice of pair). We point out that usually an attacker does not have access to such an information and is consequently less efficient (even when using the same distinguisher).
Experiments Results
For each attack, the distinguishing coefficient has been computed for each key candidate and for a given (increasing) number of power traces up to 460,000. A same and unique sample of traces has been used for all the attacks. Moreover, each trace was associated with a constant index and they were plugged in the attacks in the same order. Such a process ensured us that all the distinguishers were working in the same conditions and with exactly the same measurements. We recorded the minimal number of messages needed to have the real key ranked first (i.e., emerging from others). Results are recorded in Table 1 . Globally, the experiments confirm our simulations results: The attacks are ranked in the same order with the same difference magnitude between them. The number of traces required by the attacks to succeed makes us think that the standard deviation of the noise in the leakage is slightly smaller than 4. For Boolean and arithmetic maskings, LR attacks and CPA perform quite similarly when they are fed with the same single function (HW or Opt). Interestingly, a basis lin is the best choice for the Boolean case, whereas the quadratic terms help to improve the attack efficiency in the arithmetic case. This is totally in line with the simulations reported in Figs. 5 and 6.
LR versus CPA: A Timing Point of View
As demonstrated in [19] , the efficiency of an attack decreases exponentially with the masking order. In other terms, a successful attack will need a number of messages N growing exponentially w.r.t. the masking order. This implies that higher order attacks must be able to efficiently deal with a huge number of observations. In particular, the time spent on the processing of the observations may become a bottleneck. Although the LR processing proposed in Section 3.5 is based on matrix operations, the regression matrix has a constant size w.r.t. to N (thanks to an initial averaging step-see (6)). More precisely, the LR complexity can be split into two parts: The matrix operation which is constant w.r.t. to N and only depends on the basis size; and the least-square computation (a mean of square) which depends on N. Concerning CPA, its complexity relies on the computation of a mean of product, a product of means, and two standard deviations that all depend on N. We can, thus, expect to have a faster attack when using a LR (when N is sufficiently large to neglect the matrix operation). To quantify the timing complexity of LR, we did several timing measurements and we compared them with those for CPA attacks. We have first processed LR with a linear model as a common use case and with a full basis model as the worst possible case (for n ¼ 8), that is with the largest regression matrix (i.e., the slowest matrix computation). We remind the reader that in the latter case, the attack always failed (see Section 3.4). The results are plotted in Fig. 8a with a zoom on the small numbers of messages in Fig. 8b . The timings represented in Fig. 8 are measured over 100 attacks in an univariate setting. Since CPA and LR attacks are both univariate and are fed in this paper with the same preprocessed vector of observations (a centered product combination of two leakage vectors), only the core computation differs from one to the other:
1.
Results. First and as expected, it can be noticed that the performances of all the attacks are in the same order of magnitude (and thus are computationally viable). Nevertheless, with a linear model, the LR becomes noticeably faster than CPA attack (i.e., the constant matrix operation cost stays small and can be quickly neglected) for N > 25; 000 (Fig. 8b) . If we focus on LR with the full basis, the cost of the matrix operation is not negligible, and thus, a large number of messages (N > 10 7 messages) is needed to counterbalance it. In both cases, when the number of messages is sufficiently large to bypass the timing offset due to the matrix operation, LR is faster than CPA as expected.
2.
Conclusion. This brief analysis pinpointed the soundness of our attack also in terms of computability.
That is, in all cases the LR encompasses and outmatches CPA.
Conclusion on the Attack Simulations and Experiments
The theoretical analysis in Section 3.6 is confirmed by the experimental results. At first, they corroborate the efficiency of the LR attacks and show that they are at least as efficient as the CPA and are therefore a real alternative to it. Our simulations point out that LR attacks can even outperform CPA when the device leaks a combination of the manipulated bits that is not well approximated by a simple function (as, e.g., the Hamming weight). Also, the LR techniques introduced in this paper seem to be particularly suitable against masking schemes with complex algebraic representation over IF 2 (like the arithmetic masking). Eventually, for quite comparable attack success rates (and sometimes even better), the LR techniques are more efficient in terms of computation timings than the classical attacks. This makes them particularly interesting when the leakage noise, and hence the number of required number of traces, is high.
A second outcome of our simulations and experiments is the validation of the importance of the basis choice. Although attacks based on the optimal model in Scenario 1 (for both masking schemes) are always at the first place, this is no longer the case when the optimal model is built from a wrong hypothesis on ðÁÞ. For instance with Boolean masking, choosing a linear basis is sufficient to make LR more efficient than LR-Opt, whereas with arithmetic masking a quadratic basis is needed. Finally, as predicted in Section 3.4, the LR-full attacks (i.e., H ¼ F) always fail.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced a second-order stochastic attack, which does not assume any profiling capability on the adversary side. The attack was successfully applied to the two major first-order masking schemes, namely the Boolean and arithmetic ones. A theoretical analysis of the approach explains the core foundations of the attack, giving the reasons of its effectiveness together with its intrinsic limitations. The effectiveness of the attack is confirmed by the experiments that show that it is a good alternative to existing solutions like the second-order CPA with a combining function. Both theoretical analysis and experiments highlight the importance of the choice of the basis involved in the attack. This point should be investigated in future works to take into account other masking schemes like the multiplicative or the affine ones.
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